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COMMENT
AUDIENCE MATURITY AND THE OBJECT OF THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Phillip E. Marbury
I. INTRODUCTION
There are few issues, throughout history and still today, that evoke a
stronger reaction than the subject of religion. A person's religious beliefs are
an inextricably intimate and personal subject, and yet also, paradoxically,
something that individuals use to interact and communicate with others. In
this way, religious beliefs cannot be classified as wholly personal, wholly
communal, or wholly social. Our understanding and beliefs of who God
is-or our rejection that any god even exists-establishes the framework
through which nearly every action and perception is governed. As such, it is
no surprise that differing beliefs on the subject of religion tend to illicit very
strong emotions, and if unchecked, can lead to great destruction as often as
great compassion. Because of the vehemency of opinions pertaining to this
subject, it is no surprise that the constitutional clause addressing it is so
hotly debated and questioned. The Establishment Clause' touches upon this
most sensitive of subjects and does so in a way that few would claim to be
the model of clarity.
This Comment contends that the current Establishment Clause
jurisprudence has attempted to resolve the issue of interpreting and
applying the Establishment Clause while neglecting to keep the actual
object2 of that Clause-the protection of individuals from a forced violation
of their freedom of conscience-in mind. This abandonment of the object
of the Establishment Clause has led to a scattered-often disjointed-
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2012, Liberty University School of Law; B.B.A. Finance 2009, University of New Mexico. The
author would like to thank his wife, Erica, for her unfailing love and support throughout the
journey that is life. The author would also like to thank Travis Miller and the LIBERTY
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW staff for all the time and effort spent in editing this Comment and
providing valuable suggestions and feedback.
1. U.S. CONsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... ").
2. See infra Part IV (arguing that the object of the Establishment Clause is freedom of
conscience). The Supreme Court has supported the notion that the Establishment Clause
must be viewed through an object-type analysis. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
678 (1984) ("The purpose of the Establishment Clause 'was to state an objective, not to write
a statute."').
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spectrum of tests,' an unpredictable and uncertain ability to define the law,'
and an ever-increasing hostility toward the allowance of religion to even
exist in the public forum.s
The results of these many tests often seem to be incongruous: in Rhode
Island, the inclusion of a nativity scene within the city's Christmas display
was upheld, while in Pennsylvania, the inclusion of a nativity scene in front
of the county courthouse was struck down.' Again in Rhode Island, the
inclusion of prayer as part of a high school's graduation ceremony was
struck down,' while in Tennessee and Indiana, the inclusion of prayer in
several school-sponsored activities-including the graduation ceremony-
was upheld.' In Virginia, a daily prayer before mealtime within the military
environment of the Virginia Military Institute was struck down,"o while in
Nebraska, the formal and official government-sponsored prayer before each
legislative session was upheld." These examples serve only as a fractional
sampling of the numerous Establishment Clause cases and their often
divergent results. Although there are many complex and nuanced factors to
be considered, many of which are outside the scope of this Comment, one
factor has emerged as particularly influential: audience maturity.
This Comment supports the proposition that audience maturity-when
viewed within the appropriate understanding of the Establishment Clause's
object-is a relevant factor in determining whether a government activity
violates the Establishment Clause. 2 This emerging trend has created a
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Part II.
5. See Stratechuk v. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 597, 598-600, 610 (3d Cir. 2009) (upholding
a school's decision to remove all religiously themed music from its Christmas production).
This case specifically dealt with a school district that received a challenge from a parent for
including certain Christmas songs in its musical program, and in response, removed all
religiously themed music from its program. Id. at 600-01. It shows the measure of hostility
that any form of religion in the public arena encounters under our modern Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.
6. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687.
7. See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1989).
8. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580, 599 (1992).
9. See Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 233-34 (6th Cir. 1997); Tanford v. Brand,
104 F.3d 982, 983, 985 (7th Cir. 1997).
10. See Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 360 (4th Cir. 2003).
11. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
12. Cf Deanna N. Pihos, Assuming Maturity Matters: The Limited Reach of the
Establishment Clause at Public Universities, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 1349, 1354 (2005).
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bridge between the often disparate Establishment Clause tests, 3 but it has
also received criticism in its tendency to allow a greater degree of religious
involvement in governmental activities for older, more mature audience
members." Because the theme of maturity has become so prevalent in
modern Supreme Court opinions, it is necessary to evaluate whether
focusing on maturity as a factor of analysis tends to bring Establishment
Clause jurisprudence closer to its object or if it instead pushes it further into
the realm of subjectivity and makes it even more difficult to know, with any
degree of predictability, how any given Establishment Clause issue will be
decided.
Part II of this Comment gives a brief history of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, first outlining the four major tests that can be synthesized
from the modern Supreme Court holdings, describing the framework
through which Establishment Clause theories are most often viewed, and
then addressing where the specific issue of audience maturity has been most
influential as the central factor of analysis. Part III describes the problems
associated with the varying and unpredictable Establishment Clause tests
and then outlines the issue of how maturity affects these tests. Finally, Part
IV provides a conceptual framework through which audience maturity and
a proper understanding of the object of the Establishment Clause may be
applied in an evaluation of the various tests described in Part II. This
framework is essential for an appropriate understanding of the
Establishment Clause-not as a general protection against exposure to
others' religious beliefs and practices but as protection against the forcible
infringement by the government of an individual's right of conscience and
freedom to worship as he deems appropriate.
II. LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS
A. Establishment Clause Jurisprudence: A Tangle of Standards
The current Establishment Clause" jurisprudence does not lend itself to
a simple and conclusive analysis.'" It is incredibly difficult to predict with
13. See infra Part II. The focus on the audience when evaluating whether certain speech
or activity becomes a law respecting the establishment of religion is starting to become a
unifying theme among several of the Establishment Clause tests.
14. See infra Part III.B.
15. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . .").
16. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984). Justice Burger posited:
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any degree of certainty how the Supreme Court will rule on many of the
Establishment Clause cases that go before it; its previous holdings do not
provide an easily applicable standard. Even a Justice of the Supreme Court
has noted that Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in "hopeless
disarray."" This has resulted in the strange situation where in different
cases involving materially similar issues, the Court has come down on
seemingly dichotomous sides based on a wide spectrum of attendant
circumstances." The ambiguous nature of the constitutional language itself
serves only to complicate this problem.
Although there is no single standard by which Establishment Clause
cases are decided, most of the Court's decisions can be condensed into one
of three (or sometimes four) primary tests.20 Although the Lemon test 21 Still
remains one of the most frequently applied tests,22 the Court has found it
In the line-drawing process we have often found it useful to inquire whether
the challenged law or conduct has a secular purpose, whether its principal or
primary effect is to advance or inhibit religion, and whether it creates an
excessive entanglement of government with religion. Lemon, supra. But, we
have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be confined to any single test
or criterion in this sensitive area.
Id.
17. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
18. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671, 687 (holding that a government-owned Christmas
display including a cr&che was permissible). But see Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
573, 580, 621 (1989) (holding a Christmas display including a creche was a violation of the
Establishment Clause under slightly different circumstances).
19. See U.S. CONsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . .").
20. See Pihos, supra, note 11, at 1354-55 (showing that the Supreme Court has often
turned to either some mixture of the Lemon Test, the Coercion Test, the Endorsement Test,
or the Marsh analysis); see also Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 369-70 (4th Cir. 2003)
(pointing to the several Establishment Clause tests-Marsh analysis, Lemon Test,
Endorsement Test, and Coercion Test-that have been formulated by the Supreme Court).
21. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
22. Commenting on the state of Establishment Clause jurisprudence in the vacuum left
by failing to adhere to only one test, Robert Stelle writes:
In spite of the high degree of uncertainty regarding these questions, still
another issue is even more troubling. Specifically, the Supreme Court has failed
in recent years to clearly articulate just exactly what the proper legal test is that
is to be applied to alleged violations of the Establishment Clause. There have
been many "tests" promulgated in the past, but the current state of the law is
unsettled at best.
Robert C. Stelle, Religious Freedom in the Twenty-First Century: Life Without
Lemon, 23 S. Ill. U. L.J. 657, 658 (1999).
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often necessary to deviate from it and has subsequently established several
other standards of review."
1. The Infamous Lemon Test
In the 1971 case of Lemon v. Kurtzman," the Supreme Court established
a three-prong test for evaluating and deciding Establishment Clause
issues.25 The Court addressed two statutes-one from Pennsylvania, the
other from Rhode Island-that provided supplemental funding to private
religious schools."6 The Pennsylvania statute provided for reimbursement to
the school for some of the expenses associated with specific secular subjects,
while the Rhode Island statute provided that teachers who taught in private
schools would be paid a supplement to their salary from the state for
teaching certain secular subjects.27 The Court reasoned that, had the
Establishment Clause merely barred formal establishment of religion, the
application of the Clause in law would have been much clearer.28 Instead,
the Establishment Clause prohibits any "law respecting an establishment of
religion."29 Because of this "opaque" language,30 the Court felt it necessary to
approach the analysis by examining the three main evils that the
Establishment Clause was intended to prevent: "sponsorship, financial
support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."" In
an effort to address each of these perceived evils-wherein governments are
seen as violating the Establishment Clause-the Lemon Court created the
following three-prong test: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an
excessive government entanglement with religion."32
23. See supra note 2.
24. Lemon, 403 U.S. 602.
25. Id. at 612-13.
26. Id. at 606-07.
27. Id. at 606-08.
28. See id. at 612.
29. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
30. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
31. Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
32. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (citations omitted) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236, 243 (1968); Walz, 664 U.S. at 674) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The first prong of the test requires that courts determine whether a
particular statute has a secular purpose." In determining whether a
particular action of government has a secular purpose, courts must look to
"whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of
religion."" Additionally, although there must be a secular purpose, the
Supreme Court has made it clear that the purpose need not be exclusively
secular." Furthermore, unless the government's secular purpose is clearly a
pretext or a "sham," courts must accord deference to the government's
purported secular purpose. 6
The second prong of the test requires courts to ask whether the primary
effect of the governmental action is one that advances or inhibits religion."
Historically, in evaluating Establishment Clause claims under the Lemon
test, the Supreme Court has construed this prong as liberally as it has
construed the secular purpose prong, thus "permitting intentional
accommodations of religion so long as some secular ... effects are
present."" In further refining this particular prong, many courts have
analyzed it by asking what a "reasonable observer" would think the primary
effect of the governmental action was." This observer is also assumed to be
informedo of "all of the pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding the
symbol and its placement."' "If a reasonable observer would conclude that
the message communicated is one of either endorsement or disapproval of
33. This has since been expanded to include any action of government, not only
legislative ones. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271-72 (1981) (applying the
Lemon Test to actions taken by a university); Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982 (7th Cir. 1997)
(applying the Lemon Test to prayer in a university environment).
34. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 690 (1984)); see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 & n.42 (1985).
35. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681 & n.6.
36. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 586-87.
37. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
38. CALVIN MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND LIBERTIES 1086
(Vicki Been et al. eds., 3d ed. 2009); see also Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681-82.
39. See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 620 (1989) ("While an
adjudication of the display[] ... must take into account the perspective of one who is neither
Christian nor Jewish, as well as of those who adhere to either of these religions... the
constitutionality of its effect must also be judged according to the standard of a reasonable
observer.") (internal quotations omitted); Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 237 (6th
Cir. 1997) ("If a reasonable observer would conclude that the message communicated is one
of either endorsement or disapproval of religion, then the challenged practice is unlawful.").
40. Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 370 (4th Cir. 2003).
41. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1819-20 (2010).
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religion, then the challenged practice is unlawful."4 2 The element of the
"reasonable observer" began to bleed into the Lemon test analysis after
Justice O'Connor penned her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, "
and it remains controversial both in its use here as well as in the
"endorsement test," as discussed below." This also indicates that a
governmental practice that fails the second prong of the Lemon test is
invalid, even if it passed the first prong."
The third prong of the Lemon Test analysis requires a court to evaluate
whether a governmental action results in an excessive . . . entanglement
with religion."'46 In assessing entanglement, courts must look to several
factors, including "character and purposes" of organizations affected, the
"nature of the aid," and type of relationship that is formed between the
government and the religious authority." Where certain institutions are
benefited, the courts will assess a law's effect by determining whether the
institution's character is "predominantly religious."" In applying this
"excessive entanglement" prong, courts are concerned primarily with
situations where there are either excessive connections between government
administration and religious organizations or certain actions caused by
42. Chaudhuri, 130 F.3d at 237 (citing Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 597 (plurality
opinion)); see also Am. United for Separation of Church & State v. City of Grand Rapids, 980
F.2d 1538, 1543-44 (6th Cir. 1992)).
43. Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1824.
44. See infra Part II(A)(ii).
45. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). It
should be noted that Justice O'Connor's position is a sharp turn from what the Court
actually held and where analysis under this prong had gone up until now. Although the
Court began to incorporate her analysis more and more, see infra Part II(A)(ii), the majority
opinion in Lynch-and the Court up until then-did not endorse Justice O'Connor's
approach to determine whether a governmental action has the primary effect of endorsing
religion. Compare Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681-82 (majority opinion) (using the qualifying
adjective "primary" before "effect," indicating that some effect of advancing or inhibiting
religion is permissible as long as it is not the primary effect), with id. at 690 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("The effect prong asks whether, irrespective of government's actual purpose,
the practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval."). Justice
O'Connor would have had the test changed to strike down any governmental practice that
"conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval." Id. The majority went on to specifically
address this point in asserting that, "not every law that confers an indirect, remote, or
incidental benefit upon [religion] is, for that reason alone, constitutionally invalid." Id. at 683
(internal quotations omitted).
46. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
47. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232 (1997) (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615).
48. Id. at 232 (quoting Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 363-64 (1975)).
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government that are particularly divisive along religious lines." It is also
important to note that although the Lemon Test has been somewhat
emaciated by the implementation of various other tests, many of the other
tests incorporate elements of the Lemon's three-pronged analysis.so
2. The Endorsement Test
The Endorsement Test, as it has come to be called, first appeared in a
concurring opinion by Justice O'Connor in Lynch v. Donnelly." Justice
O'Connor posited that the Establishment Clause is violated when
government makes "adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a
person's standing in the political community."" She went on to say that this
can happen in two primary ways:s" excessive entanglement" and
"government endorsement or disapproval of religion."" Justice O'Connor
also advocated that although "political divisiveness" should not be an
independent ground for finding a governmental action unconstitutional, it
was an "evil addressed by the Establishment Clause" 6 but should be
separated out from the excessive entanglement prong of the Lemon Test."
The Court has frequently used Justice O'Connor's approach for
Establishment Clause analysis in its opinions since Lynch" and eventually
adopted it in the case of County of Allegheny v. ACLU."
Despite its somewhat frequent use, this test, in many ways, is nothing
more than a re-worked version of the Lemon Test-"a derivative of the first
49. Shahin Rezai, County of Allegheny v. ACLU: Evolution of Chaos in Establishment
Clause Analysis, 40 AM. U.L. REv. 503, 518-19 (1990).
50. See infra Parts II(A)(ii-iv).
51. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 687.
53. The similarities between Justice O'Connor's test and the Lemon test have led many
to classify her "endorsement test" as a modification to the Lemon Test, whereby she has
condensed the first two elements into one (the endorsement element) and kept the third
element intact. See Pihos, supra note 11, at 1357-58.
54. This part of Justice O'Connor's test remains substantially similar to the third prong
of the Lemon Test. See supra Part II(A)(i). Justice O'Connor clarifies that entanglement "may
interfere with the independence of the [religious] institutions, give the institutions access to
government or governmental powers not fully shared by nonadherents of the religion, and
foster the creation of political constituencies defined along religious lines." Lynch, 465 U.S. at
688.
55. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688.
56. Id. at 689.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Sante Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 314-16 (2000).
59. Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1037 (9th Cir. 2010).
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(secular purpose) and second (primary effect) prongs of Lemon."w The
major difference between the two tests is that the Endorsement Test takes
the position that "any endorsement of religion [is] invalid."61 In order to
understand the effect of the Endorsement Test in light of Lemon, one of two
things must be true: either endorsement of religion is, per se, more egregious
than having the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, or the
primary effects prong of the Lemon Test is overruled. Because the Court has
refused to acknowledge that Lemon is overruled,62 we are left with the
necessity of employing both Lemon and the Endorsement Test, even though
some argue that one is merely an expansion of the other.
3. The Coercion Test
In the words of Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, "[i]t is beyond
dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government
may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise,
or otherwise act in a way which 'establishes a [state] religion or religious
faith, or tends to do so.'"" The origin of this so-called Coercion Test is
found in Lee v. Weisman,5 where the Court began its analysis of an
Establishment Clause issue by laying out the elements of the three-prong
Lemon Test, but then-based on the inability of Lemon to appropriately
address the specific issue at hand-shifted its focus and based its holding
upon something different.' In analyzing the issue of prayer during the
graduation ceremony at a public middle school, the Court turned to the
question of whether such prayer would have a "coercive" effect on children
of this particular age.6' This Coercion Test attempts to answer whether a
governmental action might actually compel some sort of adherence or belief
in religion.6 1 One author has posited that this test developed because,
although "the Lemon test considers the government's purpose, effect, and
60. Benjamin D. Eastburn, Hold That Line! The Proper Establishment Clause Analysis for
Military Public Prayers, 22 REGENT U. L. REV. 209, 225 (2009).
61. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595 (1989) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
62. See, e.g., Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 314 (applying the Lemon Test, but calling the three
elements of that test "three factors ... which guide[] the general nature of our inquiry in this
area").
63. Pihos, supra note 11, at 1357 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1992)).
64. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
65. Eastburn, supra note 59, at 223.
66. Lee, 505 U.S. at 584-85.
67. Id. at 592.
68. Pihos, supra note 11, at 1358.
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involvement with religious activity,"69 it fails to address situations where the
government's activity actually compels certain religious activity.70 If a
government action compels religious action or participation in religious
activities, then it is considered to endorse that religion.7 ' This endorsement,
in turn, violates the Establishment Clause.
In many ways, the Coercion Test established in Lee seems a
simplification of the three prongs of the Lemon Establishment Clause
analysis, and it has become the primary test used for evaluating cases
involving school prayer. 72 The idea is that in the context of schools,
especially with younger students, peer pressure and the desire to conform to
the school authorities might effect a coercive pressure upon a student who
is subjected to a formal prayer during a school-sponsored event such as a
graduation.7 ' The Court emphasized that in determining whether an action
might have a coercive effect, the perceptions and character of the audience
must be taken into account.74 "What to most believers may seem nothing
more than a reasonable request that the nonbeliever respect their religious
practices, in a school context may appear to the nonbeliever or dissenter to
be an attempt to employ the machinery of the State to enforce a religious
orthodoxy."" The Court made it very clear that it was not holding that
prayer of this type was de facto unconstitutional, but rather that in this
particular context, due to the "heightened concerns with protecting
freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and
secondary public schools,"" it violated the Establishment Clause.n
4. Marsh v. Chambers
The Supreme Court took an almost entirely different approach to
Establishment Clause jurisprudence in the case of Marsh v. Chambers. In
Marsh, the Court evaluated the practice of using a paid chaplain to open
legislative sessions with prayer by asking whether that practice would have
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 588-89; Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265, 280 (4th Cir. 2001).
72. See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 592-93; Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 370-71 (4th Cir.
2003); Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982, 985-86 (7th Cir. 1997); Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130
F.3d 232, 238-39 (6th Cir. 1997).
73. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 592-93.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 592.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 599.
78. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
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been seen as a violation of the Establishment Clause at the time the First
Amendment was ratified." The Court pointed to the fact that the very same
writers who drafted the First Amendment-and in particular, the
Establishment Clause-had previously voted in the same week to pass a
congressional act authorizing a chaplain for the national Congress."o This is
at odds with the understanding that the authors of the First Amendment
would have considered legislative prayer to be something "respecting an
establishment of religion."" According to the Court, "[t]his interchange
emphasizes that the delegates did not consider opening prayers as a
proselytizing activity or as symbolically placing the government's official
seal of approval on one religious view."82
The Court found that prayer in this context was not an "'establishment'
of religion or a step toward establishment," but rather "simply a tolerable
acknowledgement of beliefs widely held among the people of this
country."83 This use of language is significant. Just as the Lemon Court
emphasized the distinction between a law that would actually establish
religion and a law respecting the establishment of religion," the Marsh
Court made the distinction between "establishment" of religion and "a step
toward establishment."" Under this holding, it is plausible to assume that
the Court has interpreted a "law respecting an establishment of religion" 6 as
being a law taking "step[s] toward establishment.""
Justice Brennan, dissenting in Marsh, attempted to minimize the effect of
the holding by relegating it to "an exception to the Establishment Clause
rather than reshaping Establishment Clause doctrine to accommodate
legislative prayer."" Justice Brennan's characterization of the Marsh holding
was an attempt to limit the effect that it might have on future Establishment
Clause cases, claiming instead that Marsh upheld legislative prayer only "on
account of its 'unique history.""' Because of the majority's use of history in
determining whether a certain governmental practice is actually a violation
of the Establishment Clause, Justice Brennan claimed that the Court had
79. Id. at 790-92.
80. Id. at 790.
81. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790-91.
82. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
83. Id.
84. See supra Part II(A)(1).
85. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792.
86. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
87. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792.
88. Id. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 795 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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simply "exempted [legislative prayer] from the First Amendment's
prohibition against the establishment of religion.""o
In his dissenting opinion in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Justice
Kennedy took exception to Justice Brennan's position." Justice Kennedy
criticized Justice Brennan's comments, pointing out that the premise of
Justice Brennan's criticism-that "historical patterns ca[n] justify
contemporary violations of constitutional guarantees" 92-is an erroneous
understanding of the Court's holding in Marsh.93 Instead, "Marsh stands for
the proposition, not that specific practices common in 1791 are an
exception to the otherwise broad sweep of the Establishment Clause, but
rather that the meaning of the Clause is to be determined by reference to
historical practices and understandings."94 Accordingly, the rule adopted in
Marsh is not some arbitrary exception to an otherwise consistent rule;
rather, it is "[a] test for implementing the protections of the Establishment
Clause." Regardless of which side of this discussion one comes down on,
one thing remains true: under either view, the Marsh Court-both the
majority and dissenting opinions-was very clear in stating that historical
precedence does not, by itself, exempt a practice from Establishment Clause
scrutiny, but it is also "not something to be lightly cast aside."9'
B. The Doctrinal Foundations: Understanding the Establishment Clause
Through the Doctrinal Lens of Strict Separation, Accommodation, and
Flexible Accommodation
For the purposes of this Comment, it is important to understand that
some scholars view Establishment Clause jurisprudence through a lens that
stands apart from the actual tests the Court has in place for evaluating
Establishment Clause issues.97 This approach views all Establishment Clause
issues as being evaluated-no matter which test is applied-based on one of
"three schools of thought: strict separation, accommodation, and flexible
accommodation." Under the strict separation viewpoint, Jefferson's
90. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 669-70 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting in
part).
92. Id. (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790).
93. Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 670.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790.
97. Rezai, supra note 48, at 506.
98. Id.
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statement regarding a "wall of separation between church and state" has
been adopted as the measure of Establishment Clause violations" and is
interpreted "as prohibiting not only an official establishment of a church
but also requiring an absolute bar against governmental actions affecting
religion and religious practices."" The second and third approaches-
accommodation and flexible accommodation' 0 1-view the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause as being in a constant state of
tension,'02 but that both have the same ultimate goal of "protecting religious
freedom.'03 To resolve the tension between the two clauses,
99. An example of the strict separationist view can be found in the dissenting opinion of
Everson v. Bd. of Educ.:
Neither so high nor so impregnable today as yesterday is the wall raised
between church and state by Virginia's great statute of religious freedom and
the First Amendment, now made applicable to all the states by the Fourteenth.
New Jersey's statute sustained is the first, if indeed it is not the second breach to
be made by this Court's action. That a third, and a fourth, and still others will
be attempted, we may be sure.
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 29 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). The New Jersey
statute at issue involved the use of public funds-through public buses-for transportation
of students to private Catholic schools. Id. at 29-30.
100. Rezai, supra note 48, at 507.
101. In Lynch, the Court argued that the "wall between church and state" was "not a
wholly accurate description of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact exists
between church and state." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984). The Court further
emphasized the tension between the two religious clauses and how that tension is resolved in
stating:
[T]he Constitution [does not] require complete separation of church and state;
it affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions,
and forbids hostility toward any. Anything less would require the callous
indifference we have said was never intended by the Establishment Clause.
Indeed, we have observed, such hostility would bring us into war with our
national tradition as embodied in the First Amendment's guaranty of the free
exercise of religion.
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
102. Rezai, supra note 48, at 511. This tension exists because, as one author writes:
Accommodationists argue that there is an inherent tension between the free
exercise and establishment clauses and that if each were taken to its logical
conclusion they will inevitably clash. For example, some neutral government
actions burden religious practices, compelling the government to either modify
its actions or to provide exemptions to avoid hindering the free exercise of
religion. Such modifications or exemptions, however, clash with the
establishment clause's prohibition against state action based on religious
grounds.
Id. at 511-12.
103. Id. at 513.
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accommodationists have taken the view that "the establishment clause
[functions] more as a prohibition against the state's interference in matters
of conscience [rather] than as a safeguard against religious encroachment
on the political process."'
C. Landing in the Battle Zone: Audience Maturity and the Establishment
Clause Tests
1. Maturity as the Analytical Focus
In her article, Assuming Maturity Matters: The Limited Reach of the
Establishment Clause at Public Universities, Deanna Pihos addresses the
specific issue of school prayer in higher education environments.' 5 In
particular, she discusses the various Establishment Clause tests"o6 and shows
how the courts have, both directlyo' and indirectly, 08 attributed a different
degree of examination and scrutiny based on differences in audience
maturity.'09 She goes on to note that the Supreme Court, in Marsh v.
Chambers," mentioned that members of the legislature are adults and thus
not susceptible to peer pressure and coercion."' By comparing the results
from cases such as Lee v. Weisman"2 and Marsh v. Chambers"' and
evaluating the various court holdings and dictum,"4 Pihos arrives at the
following conclusion: "it is clear that the level of education at which the
prayer occurs is a crucial factor in determining the scrutiny to which the
104. Id.
105. Pihos, supra note 11, at 1349.
106. Id. at 1356-59.
107. Id. at 1363-64. ("The Supreme Court has cited both the age and maturity of the
prayer's audience as a justification for why instances of prayer in higher education might
demand less exacting scrutiny than prayer in primary or secondary education.").
108. Id. at 1363. The author writes:
Despite a dearth of case law directly addressing prayer in higher education, the
reasoning in cases addressing other types of Establishment Clause violations in
higher education, as well as dicta in cases addressing school prayer at the
primary and secondary levels, reveals that courts are likely to scrutinize prayer
differently based on the level of education at which it occurs.
Id.
109. Id. at 1363-66.
110. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 783 (1983).
111. Pihos, supra note 11, at 1365 (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792).
112. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
113. Marsh, 463 U.S. 783.
114. Pihos, supra note 11, at 1362-65.
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Court will subject the prayer.""' Regardless of whether the author's
underlying assumptions-prayer's appropriate place, whether the level of
education is indicative of maturity, and whether maturity should even be an
appropriate factor-are correct, it is clear that she has identified an
important observation: audience maturity is a significant factor in
determining whether a government action violates the Establishment
Clause under the modern Court's interpretation of that clause.
2. Maturity and Higher Education: Prayer at Public Universities.
To understand the relevance of maturity in Establishment Clause cases,
the three cases of Tanford v. Brand,"6 Chaudhuri v. Tennessee,"' and Mellen
v. Bunting"'8 must be more thoroughly discussed.
115. Id. at 1365. The author goes on to state that
[bly prominently invoking age and maturity in Marsh, and subsequently
reiterating in school prayer cases that a prayer's threat may vary depending on
the level of education at which the prayer occurs, the Court has created a
challenging environment for plaintiffs who wish to contest state-sponsored
prayer at public universities. This environment has enabled the circuits that
have thus far addressed prayer in a university setting to forego any meaningful
discussion about the effects and concerns surrounding prayer in higher
education by simply citing the age and maturity of the audience.
Id.
Note the language used in the above quote. The author hits on a very important
distinction the courts have looked to in determining establishment clause cases. However,
the author points specifically to the "prayer's threat," and the subsequent "challenging
environment" that the courts have created through this test as if assuming that a difficulty in
challenging this type of action is necessarily wrong. The underlying assumption to her
argument, one must presume, is that something closer to an absolute separation of church
and state is ideal. Thus, the idea is that a difficulty in challenging this type of behavior is a
bad thing only insofar as those specific things are, in-and-of-themselves, violations of the
Establishment Clause; if any prayer is assumed to be violative of the Establishment Clause,
then her assertion would be absolutely correct, and the implication she gives that such
holdings are erroneous would similarly be appropriate. However, if an absolute separation of
church and state is not the ideal endpoint, then a critical evaluation and understanding of
maturity might warrant a closer look than Pihos would have the court give it, and her critical
language regarding the "challenging environment" reflects exactly what it ought to reflect.
It is important to emphasize, however, that she does not prove the assumption of
absolute separation or that prayer should absolutely be disallowed. Quite to the contrary, the
courts-through the very cases she mentions-have established that certain exhibitions of
prayer are not violative of the Establishment Clause. The importance of carefully
distinguishing "prayer" as a stand-alone violation, and prayer-in the context of the specific
situation-will be further addressed in Part III.
116. Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982 (7th Cir. 1997).
117. Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232 (6th Cir. 1997).
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In Tanford, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed the issue of
prayer within the public university environment under two different
Supreme Court standards, and it found that under either standard, the
practices of the university"' were constitutional.120 The first standard it
looked to was the rule established in the case of Lee v. Weisman,12' where
the Court held that the inclusion of an invocation at a middle school
commencement ceremony violated the Establishment Clause because it
exerted coercive pressure on students of primary and secondary school age
to participate in the speaker's prayer.122 The Tanford court held that this
standard was inapplicable to the case before it because the plaintiffs were
"adults rather than younger students requiring special solicitude." 23 The
court reasoned that adult students were not as susceptible to peer-pressure,
and that in this case, "there was no coercion-real or otherwise-to
participate."'24 The implication is that adults are able to discern and filter
for themselves what they do or do not wish to participate in and believe,
and thus, there was no longer a sense that participation in the religious
exercise was "in a fair and real sense obligatory.""'
The second standard the Tanford court applied'26 was the Lemon Test.127
Using this test, the court found that the invocation and benediction had the
legitimate secular purpose of "solemnizing public occasions."1 28 The court
emphasized that "the First Amendment was not intended to prohibit states
[here a university] from sanctioning ceremonial invocations of God. Such
action simply does not amount to an establishment of religion" 29 Finally,
the court reasoned that the process of inviting a clergy member to give the
invocation and benediction was not "excessive entanglement of church and
state."' The inclusion of a religious invocation and benediction at a public
118. Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2003).
119. The plaintiffs in Tanford filed for an injunction against Indiana University that
would prohibit it from giving an invocation or benediction during the May 19, 1995
Commencement Ceremony. Tanford, 104 F.3d at 983.
120. Id. at 985-86.
121. Id. at 985.
122. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992).
123. Tanford, 104 F.3d at 985.
124. Id.
125. Id. (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 586).
126. Id. at 986.
127. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
128. Tanford, 104 F.3d at 986.
129. Id. (quoting Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437, 448 (7th Cir.
1992).
130. Id.
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university or college event was not found to be a violation of the
Establishment Clause."
During that same year, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this
very issuel32 in the case of Chaudhuri v. Tennessee'33 and scrutinized it with
an extensive and detailed Lemon-test analysis.'34 In addressing the first
element, often called the "secular purpose" element, the court emphasized
that a government activity need not be exclusively secular, but rather it
must only have a secular purpose.'35 The court pointed to several Supreme
Court decisions showing that a purported secular purpose is entitled to
deference "unless it seems to be a sham."'36 The court found that "[a] prayer
may serve to dignify or to memorialize a public occasion. . . . These are
legitimate secular purposes. "'' Furthermore, the court reasoned that even
though the particular prayers under evaluation evoked "a monotheistic
tradition not shared by Hindus such as Dr. Chaudhuri,"3 8 it was
nonetheless valid because, under Chambers, if the prayer has not "been
exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith
or belief," then the specific content of the prayer is not the concern of the
court."'
In addressing the second prong of the Lemon Test, commonly referred to
as the "primary effects" prong, the Chaudhuri court found that no
131. Id.
132. The original complaint in Chaudhuri was against the university's practice of
including a benediction or invocation at various university functions, such as graduation
exercises, faculty meetings, dedication ceremonies, and guest lectures. Chaudhuri v.
Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 233-34 (6th Cir. 1997). After the plaintiff filed his suit, however, the
university changed its policy to include only a moment of silence at these types of events. Id.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed both of these issues in its opinion; although
the claim for an injunctive action against the university had become moot in regard to the
actual invocations and benedictions, the plaintiff continued to seek monetary damages,
which caused it to remain a live controversy. Id. at 235.
133. Both cases were decided in 1997. Tanford, 104 F.3d at 982; Chaudhuri, 130 F.3d at
232.
134. Chaudhuri, 130 F.3d at 236-38.
135. Id. at 236 (referencing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 & n.6 (1984); Bown v.
Gwinnett Cnty. Sch. Dist., 112 F.3d 1464, 1469 (11th Cir. 1997).
136. Id. at 236 (referencing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987); Bown, 112
F.3d at 1469).
137. Id.
138. Dr. Dilip K. Chaudhuri, the plaintiff, was a professor of mechanical engineering at
Tennessee State University. He was "[aln adherent of the Hindu religion" and filed suit
against "TSU's custom of having prayers offered at university functions such as graduation
exercises, faculty meetings, dedication ceremonies, and guest lectures." Id. at 233-34.
139. Id. at 237 (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794-95); Id. at 233-34.
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reasonable observer would conclude from the prayer that the university was
trying to indoctrinate the audience.' Finally, the court disposed of the
third prong of the Lemon Test-the "excessive entanglement" prong-by
reasoning that inviting a local clergyman or a professor at the university to
speak at graduation, and requesting that their prayers be nonsectarian in
nature, did not constitute "any church-state entanglement at all, let alone
'excessive' entanglement.""' Without relying exclusively on the issue of
maturity, the court undertook a Lemon-test analysis and concluded that the
Establishment Clause had not been violated by the inclusion of benedictions
and invocations at various University events.142
The Chaudhuri court went on to explain why Lee v. Weisman was not
applicable to the case before it.'43 While emphasizing that the Supreme
Court has specifically declined to address whether this type of prayer was
"acceptable if the affected citizens are mature adults," it acknowledged that
"the State may not .. . place primary and secondary school children in this
position."'" The Chaudhuri court relied on the emphasis of the Supreme
Court in Lee to distinguish the two cases, by pointing to the increased
concerns when dealing with children in primary and secondary school
settings, because younger-aged children are more susceptible to pressure
and indirect coercion."' The court then explained how unreasonable it
would be to assume that a mature adult would be indoctrinated by this type
of prayer.'46 The court held that, even if Dr. Chaudhuri had been required
to attend the events,'47 "he would not have had to participate in the prayers
or pay any attention to them."'4 ' As a result, "[t]here was absolutely no risk
that Dr. Chaudhuri-or any other unwilling adult listener-would be
indoctrinated by exposure to the prayers." 49
Only in the context of an authoritarian, military-style university level
program has prayer for college-aged adults ever been held to constitute a
140. Id. at 237 ("It would not be reasonable to suppose that an audience of college-
educated adults could be influenced unduly by prayers of the sort in question here.").
141. Id. at 234, 238.
142. Id. at 236-38.
143. Id. at 238-39.
144. Id. at 238 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992)).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 239 ("'[Hlere there was no coercion-real or otherwise-to participate' in the
nonsectarian prayers." (quoting Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982, 985 (7th Cir. 1997)).
147. Graduation ceremonies, faculty meetings, guest lectures, etc. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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violation of the Establishment Clause.'s In Mellen, a chaplain led a "supper
prayer" every night before the cadets were allowed to eat at the Virginia
Military Academy (VMI)."' Although cadets were not "obligated to recite
the prayer, close their eyes, or bow their heads," they were forced to "remain
standing and silent while the supper prayer [was] read."'52 The school
adhered to a strict militaristic structure where obedience was expected, and
conformity and compliance strictly required; it was an "adversative method
involv[ing] a rigorous and punishing system of indoctrination."' This
system allowed for the entire class to be punished for the errors or mistakes
of a single individual or, conversely, for the entire class to be praised for the
exemplary behavior of a single individual.'
Under these facts, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that prayer
recitation before each supper violated the Establishment Clause, because
"VMI's adversative method of education emphasizes the detailed regulation
of conduct and the indoctrination of a strict moral code.""' The court
emphasized this unique situation in distinguishing this case from the
decisions of its sister courts in the Sixth and Seventh Circuits."'
Impliedly agreeing with the decisions in Chaudhuri and Tanford,' the
Fourth Circuit reasoned that the more appropriate test to apply in this
situation was the Coercion Test established in Lee."' Even though the VMI
cadets were college-aged adults, "in VMI's educational system they [were]
uniquely susceptible to coercion.""' Having summarily dismissed Marsh as
150. Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 371-72 (4th Cir. 2003).
151. Id. at 362.
152. Id. (alteration in original).
153. Id. at 361 (alteration in original).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 371.
156. Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232 (6th Cir. 1997); Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d
982 (7th Cir. 1997). In drawing this distinction, the Mellen court commented:
It is undoubtedly true that grade school children are particularly "susceptible to
pressure from their peers towards conformity." Recognizing a difference
between such children and college students, certain of our sister circuits have
approved the decisions of public universities to offer an invocation at
graduation ceremonies . . . because "an audience of college-educated adults
could [not] be influenced unduly by prayers of the sort in question here."
Mellen, 327 F.3d at 371 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992); Chaudhuri, 130
F.3d at 237).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 371-72.
159. Id. at 371 (alteration in original).
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a point of analysis,'" the Fourth Circuit held that prayer in the context of
VMI's adversarial system of education was impermissible.'6' "Because of
VMI's coercive atmosphere, the Establishment Clause precludes school
officials from sponsoring an official prayer, even for mature adults." 62
III. THE PROBLEM WITH MATURITY AS THE END-POINT OF ANALYSIS
A. A Law with no Predictability
As described above, the current state of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is almost incoherent. 6 One of the law's central purposes is to
provide those whom it governs with predictability in knowing whether their
actions comport with lawful behavior. A law that lacks predictability
becomes ineffective and seemingly arbitrary.'" The multiplicity of
Establishment Clause tests' 5 reveals the weakness in our legal system's
approach to this very important issue. As a result, case outcomes are largely
determined by the personal views of the Justices. Even in situations with
160. Id. at 369-70.
161. Id. at 360, 376-77. The court also noted that the "supper prayer" had only been
instituted in 1995, id at 362 n.5, possibly attempting to dispel any idea that it was grounded
in the historic traditions of this nation. Although the Fourth Circuit summarily dismissed
Marsh v. Chambers as applicable in its case, it did so by arriving at an incorrect
understanding of the Marsh holding, implying that the Supreme Court upheld legislative
prayer only based on its place in history. Id. at 369-70. The correct understanding of this
opinion focuses not on the idea that government action might avoid constitutional scrutiny
based on its historic precedence, but rather on using the historic precedence to formulate an
understanding of the object of the Establishment Clause itself. See supra Part II(A)(iv).
162. Mellen, 327 F.3d at 371-72.
163. See supra Part II(A).
164. "It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its
prohibitions are not clearly defined." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
"A statute can be impermissibly vague for either of two independent reasons. First, if it fails
to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what
conduct it prohibits. Second, if it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement." Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000) (citing Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S.
41, 56-57 (1999)); see also United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008).
These basic due process principles have been applied by the Court throughout
United States history as basic tenets of constitutional law. Although the necessity to
accommodate more ambiguous language and tests is understandable when addressing issues
as complex as the First Amendment, it seems clear that the basic requirements of due process
are at least in question when a single clause of the Constitution garners at least four different
and distinct tests, to be used or discarded purely at the discretion of the court before whom
an action is brought.
165. See supra Part II(A)(1)-(4).
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issues and facts that are materially similar, the Court has shown its
propensity to arrive at diametrically opposed conclusions.'" Even if these
incongruent opinions could appropriately be distinguishable enough to
merit differing conclusions, it still remains clear that there is no agreed-
upon standard for adjudicating Establishment Clause issues. It is nearly
impossible to find any two cases that apply the same test. Instead, the
availability of multiple tests allows judges the discretion to determine a
result they would like to see and then to find a test (or make a new one, if
needed) that would best get them to that result. It must be noted that this is
166. An example of this kind of contradiction can be found in the two cases of Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) and Cnty. ofAllegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). In both
of these cases, the particular government action in question was the display of a crche as
part of a Christmas display on property accessible and open to the public. Lynch, 465 U.S. at
671; Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 578-79.
In Lynch, the Court upheld the display after describing the role of the Establishment
Clause in American history and in legal jurisprudence. Specifically, Justice Burger, writing
for the Court, emphasized that "[n]o significant segment of our society and no institution
within it can exist in a vacuum or in total or absolute isolation from all the other parts, much
less from government." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673. He went on to write: "[nior does the
Constitution require complete separation of church and state; it affirmatively mandates
accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any." Id.
In direct contrast to Lynch, and only 5 short years later, the Court struck down a
similar cr~che display as violative of the Establishment Clause. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 621.
Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, distinguished the case from Lynch by pointing to
the fact that the crche at issue here included the words, "Gloria in Excelsis Deo!" on a
banner held by an angel. Id. at 580. Although it pointed to several other minor differences,
this combined with the fact that there were other, less religious symbols-such as a
Christmas tree-that could be used, which made the cr&he display a violation of the
Establishment Clause. Id. at 601-02, 614-21. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the creche
in this case was impermissible: "It [Allegheny County] has chosen to celebrate Christmas in a
way that has the effect of endorsing a patently Christian message: Glory to God for the birth
of Jesus Christ. . . . [Niothing more is required to demonstrate a violation of the
Establishment Clause." Id. at 601-02.
While striking down the display of the cr&he, however, the Court upheld the
inclusion of a menorah, because although "[tihe menorah, one must recognize, is a religious
symbol," its "message is not exclusively religious. The menorah is the primary visual symbol
for a holiday [Chanukah] that, like Christmas, has both religious and secular dimensions."
Id. at 613-14. Furthermore, in attempting to square its holding with that of Lynch, the Court
glosses over the fact that the crache at issue in Lynch was actually owned by the government,
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671, while the crdche at issue in Allegheny was owned by a Roman
Catholic organization. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 600.
The comparison of these two cases merits a much more in-depth analysis than is
briefly discussed here, but such an analysis is outside the scope of this Comment, where it is
only important to realize the subjectivity and arbitrariness that comes to the front when the
Court addresses an Establishment Clause issue under its modern jurisprudence.
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not a one-side-of-the-political-spectrum tendency; an analytical framework
that allows for this kind of discretion practically ensures that results-
oriented approaches will be taken, and it is evidenced whether the majority
is advocating for an expanded capacity of religious expression or more
limited government-religion interaction. With no clear standard, the judges
and Justices who must decide these complex cases are left to fill in the gaps,
and it should be no surprise that the results of such ideologically-oriented
opinions have such disparate results.
B. Focusing on Maturity: Arbitrary Distinction or Essential Difference?
Although the Court has never explicitly addressed audience maturity as a
stand-alone factor, certain comments indicate that the Justices are taking
cognizance of this factor.' The Court has specifically mentioned that
maturity may change the way it would view things such as school prayer,
and it has implied that where such prayer is impermissible at the primary
and secondary age levels, it may be permissible with "mature adults."' 8 The
cases generally agree that prayer or other religious activities within the
primary and secondary public schools is impermissible.'69 The Court has
also indicated, however, that "young adults" are "less impressionable than
younger students," and they are arguably more likely to understand when a
government action is actually establishing religion rather than merely being
"neutral toward religion."' Similarly, the Court has pointed to the fact that
"college students are less impressionable and less susceptible to religious
indoctrination."m
It is easy to see the importance that the courts have placed on audience
maturity when you combine the language used in these opinions with the
language used in cases like Marsh. By upholding the inclusion of legislative
prayer, the Court showed just how relevant audience maturity was: "[h]ere,
the individual claiming injury by the practice is an adult, presumably not
167. Pihos,supra note 11, at 1362-63.
168. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992).
169. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (striking down a law that
required either the elimination of evolution or the inclusion of intelligent design along with
evolution from school curriculum at the primary and secondary level); Lee, 505 U.S. at 599
(striking down school prayer at the primary and secondary school level); Santa Fe Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (striking down the inclusion of student-led prayer at a
high school football game).
170. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 n.14 (1981).
171. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971).
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readily susceptible to 'religious indoctrination,' or peer pressure."172 Even
the previously discussed cases of Chaudhuri, Tanford, and Mellen show that
the maturity of the audience has been considered a key factor in
determining Establishment Clause issues. Marsh simply completes the
spectrum by showing the maturity analysis's effects on an audience of
adults.
One commentator, Deanna Pihos, decries the mature/immature
distinction as leading to the dangerous situation of precluding
Establishment Clause challenges in higher education.7 7 For example, Pihos
specifically claims that the emphasis on maturity by the Supreme Court and
the subsequent decisions of the Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits "reveal
the difficulty, if not impossibility, of bringing a successful Establishment
Clause challenge."'7 ' But this assertion assumes that any exposure to
religion or religious themes is something that must be protected against. 175
If the Establishment Clause was meant to protect individuals from exposure
to religion in any form, then Pihos's assertion would undoubtedly be
correct. Similarly, if it was the Establishment Clause's purpose to protect the
rights of individuals from all religious exposure or religious interaction,
then the inclusion of maturity as a factor in the evaluation of whether the
Establishment Clause is violated would be irrelevant. If exposure to religion
itself violates the Establishment Clause, then the audience's level of maturity
should not matter at all. This understanding of the Establishment Clause,
however, is completely at odds with the meaning that has actually been
ascribed to it throughout this nation's history and is incongruent with the
words of the Clause itself. Thus, although Pihos has identified a helpful and
informative distinction in recognizing the significance of maturity in
addressing Establishment Clause claims, she arrives at the wrong
conclusion in regard to whether such an emphasis is appropriate.'7 1
Having determined that audience maturity does play a significant role in
the Court's current Establishment Clause jurisprudence, it is important to
address the relevant question: How should a court appropriately consider
172. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (quoting Tilton, 403 U.S. at 686).
173. Pihos, supra note 11, at 1366.
174. Id.
175. This is evident in Pihos's article by the language that she uses. Even the headings and
subheadings of her article evidence the fact that she considers any exposure to prayer
improper: "Questioning the Assumption: A Necessary Undertaking to Increase Protection
Against Prayer in Higher Education," and "Applying the Assumption: Precluding Protection
in Higher Education Under Any Test or Standard," express her assumption that exposure to
religion is a potentially harmful experience. Id. at 1366, 1371.
176. Id. at 1375-76.
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the audience's maturity in deciding whether a specific government action
violates the Establishment Clause?
IV. SOLUTION: PLACING MATURITY IN ITS APPROPRIATE PLACE
A. The Object of the Establishment Clause: Freedom of Conscience
To understand audience maturity in the context of the Establishment
Clause, it is necessary to go back to the language of the Establishment
Clause,"' identify the object of the clause, and evaluate the relevance, if any,
that maturity has to that object. The Establishment Clause states that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion. ."
Of the three doctrinal positions that comprise how one approaches their
understanding of the Establishment Clause's meaning,"' only those
ascribing to the strict separationist viewpoint would contend that this clause
represents a mandate to follow what Jefferson so famously titled the wall of
separation between church and state.'80 Because that viewpoint has found
little to no favor in American jurisprudence outside of scholarly debate, and
because the adoption of such a viewpoint would essentially be the same as
concluding that the First Amendment provided an affirmative duty of the
government to protect individuals from exposure to religion and religious
activities, it will not be considered further in this Comment. As long as it is
conceded that the Establishment Clause does not require strict separation of
church and state, it then becomes necessary to determine when the overlap
between government action and religious activities goes from being merely
a "public acknowledgment of religion's role in society"' to an
impermissible establishment of religion.
Chief Justice Story, commenting on the Establishment Clause, drew a
clear distinction between governmental encouragement of religion and
177. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
178. Id.
179. See supra Part II(B).
180. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984). Justice Burger points to Jefferson's
letter to the Danbury Baptist Association and writes:
The concept of a "wall" of separation is a useful figure of speech probably
deriving from views of Thomas Jefferson. The metaphor has served as a
reminder that the Establishment Clause forbids an established church or
anything approaching it. But the metaphor itself is not a wholly accurate
description of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact exists between
church and state.
Id.
181. Salazarv. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1818 (2010).
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governmental support of religion when he noted that "the right to force the
consciences of other men, or to punish them for worshipping God in the
manner, which, they believe, their accountability to him requires," would be
a violation of the Establishment Clause.'82 Chief Justice Story emphasized
that the Establishment Clause was not intended to prohibit governments
from encouraging religion, piety, and virtue,' but instead pointed to
identifying the limits by which a government could appropriately foster and
encourage religion:' 4
Three cases may easily be supposed. One, where a government
affords aid to a particular religion, leaving all persons free to
adopt any other; another, where it creates an ecclesiastical
establishment for the propagation of the doctrines of a particular
sect of that religion, leaving a like freedom to all others; and a
third, where it creates such an establishment, and excludes all
persons, not belonging to it, either wholly, or in part, from any
participation in the public honours, trusts, emoluments,
privileges, and immunities of the state.185
He goes on to argue that the first of these three situations-that in which a
government would afford aid to a particular religion, but leave individuals
free to adopt and follow any religion-is clearly appropriate for a
government, and thus not violative of the Establishment Clause.'86 The last
of these three, wherein the government creates an actual established religion
and penalizes those who refuse to participate, is clearly something that the
Establishment Clause was meant to protect against.8 7 He spends slightly
more time on the second hypothetical-the creation of a religious
establishment that advocates the "doctrines of a particular sect of that
religion" but leaves individuals free to reject that without penalty-and
eventually arrives at the conclusion that this is an area that should
182. 3 JOSEPH L. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§1870 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. Publ'ns 1991) (1833).
183. Id. §1865.
184. Id. §1866.
185. Id.
186. Id. §1867. It is informative that Justice Story starts from a presumption that
government will seek, at the very least, to aid a particular form of religion. The question at
the time was not how to remove religion from all state activity; rather, the question was how
to determine at what point such overlap became establishment.
187. Id. §1870.
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appropriately be left to the states."' Those reading this article might feel
strong approbation toward the views of Chief Justice Story, but it is relevant
to any discussion about what the Establishment Clause actually means to
understand how it was viewed during its creation and in the years from
then until now.
The question of whether a government action is actually one respecting
the establishment of religion, as opposed to one that might have the
appearance of aiding religion, is an important insight to be gained from an
understanding of how Chief Justice Story approached the Establishment
Clause.'" The object of the Establishment Clause is to prevent government
from using its inherent power to infringe upon an individual's inalienable
right of conscience. This object is what Chief Justice Story was considering
when he drew the distinctions between the three hypothetical situations-
affording aid to religion, creating an ecclesiastical establishment for the
propagation of doctrines, and actual establishment with adherence
punitively enforced-where an Establishment Clause issue might arise."'
This is why maturity is relevant to the discussion. The question of audience
maturity is actually aimed at something else: namely, whether a specified
government action is one that "respect[s] an establishment of religion,""' in
that it invades an individual's freedom and right of conscience. In this way,
several of the tests outlined previously in this Commentl9 are appropriately
aimed at the real and appropriate issues. The Coercion Test is nearing this
object-protecting the right of conscience-when it attempts to discover
whether government action has a coercive effect on individuals, and to this
end, maturity is relevant because an individual's maturity level will often
dictate the degree to which he is able to discern when his freedom of
conscience is being infringed or his conscience forced.
188. Id. §1873. Although not within the scope of this Comment, the reader should note
the perspective that the federal government was inherently more limited than the state
governments in its reach and authority.
189. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 799 (1995) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) ("If a reasonable person could perceive a government endorsement of religion
from a private display, then the State may not allow its property to be used as a forum for
that display.").
190. STORY, supra note 181, at §1866.
191. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I
192. See supra Part(II)(A).
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B. Viewing the Establishment Clause Tests and Audience Maturity Through
the Lens of the Object
Having established that maturity is relevant to the extent that it helps
expose whether a law or government action violates the object of the
Establishment Clause, it will prove helpful to evaluate the several tests
outlined above and show how the factors might be applied under the
framework of each of these tests. Although the application of a general
object analysis and its application to the following tests would necessitate a
more involved analysis, such an analysis exceeds the scope of this Comment
inasmuch as it goes beyond the discussion of audience maturity; this means
that in some situations, even if the analysis under the various tests may not
change significantly with the addition of audience maturity as a relevant
factor, the analysis would certainly be different if the entirety of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence were shifted to reflect this object-
oriented approach."' The following discussion of these four tests will be
limited to the subject of audience maturity in relation to the object test.
1. The Lemon has Turned Sour
The three prongs of the Lemon Test-secular purpose, primary effect,
and excessive entanglement-are aimed at expanding the meaning of the
Establishment Clause to cover the exact situation that Chief Justice Story set
up in his first of the three situations.' The government affording aid to a
particular religion, but leaving individuals free to believe as they would
believe, is clearly violative of every prong of the Lemon Test. There is no
secular purpose for aiding a particular religion. The primary effect-aiding
religion-is explicitly one that advances religion, and this type of situation
is difficult to defend as being free of entanglement if simple divisiveness
along religious lines is sufficient to establish such entanglement.'
Each of these prongs focuses only on the existence of religious influence
and relationship, to the complete abrogation of an evaluation of actual
effect on an individual's freedom of conscience. It might be precisely for
this reason that the Court has gone so far out of its way to curtail the effects,
193. This point cannot be overemphasized. Due to the scope of this Comment, only
audience maturity is being evaluated, and it must be understood that many of the
Establishment Clause tests include analysis on several other important factors. In order to
arrive at what this author believes is an appropriate understanding of the Establishment
Clause en totem, each of those factors must be subject to analysis through the lens of the
object herein described-that of protecting the individual's freedom and right of conscience.
194. See supra note 184.
195. See supra note 46.
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scope, and even application of this test. Because striking a statute down for
simply having a religious purpose would be inconsistent with a rational
understanding of what the Establishment Clause was actually intended for,
the courts have attempted to limit the first prong's reach to require only a
secular purpose, not an exclusively secular one.'96 The same limitations have
been imposed on the second prong, allowing "accommodations of religion
so long as some secular ... effects are present."'97 These requisite limitations
are indicative of an understanding in the Court that the Lemon Test has
simply missed the mark when it comes to the Establishment Clause. Even
the existence of many other Establishment Clause tests reflects the Court's
general approbation against consistently applying the Lemon Test. One very
strong possibility is that this marginalization is necessary due to the fact
that the Lemon Test affords no consideration to audience maturity." By
excluding this factor, and other factors that might more adequately gauge a
law's effect on an individual's right of conscience-rather than mere
exposure to religious activity-the Lemon Test fails to adequately guide any
court in determining when the Establishment Clause has been violated. Its
inadequacy, however, has not prevented it from being retained and
resurrected if it is deemed the best tool by which the Court can achieve the
result it seeks in any particular case:
Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits
up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed
and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause
jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and
school attorneys . . . . Its most recent burial, only last Term, was,
to be sure, not fully six feet under: Our decision . . .
conspicuously avoided using the supposed "test" but also
196. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 & n.6 (1984).
197. MASSEY, supra note 37, at 1086; see also Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681-82.
198. One possible exception to this statement is found within a more recent change that
has been applied to the Lemon Test: incorporating the "reasonable observer" in determining
what the primary effect of a government action is. See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803,
1819-20 (2010).
It is important, however, to recognize that the very reason this change was necessary
to make the Lemon Test more adequate shows its failure to address the core issue: the object
of the Establishment Clause. The incorporation of this "reasonable observer" is a too-late
attempt to bring the Lemon Test in line with that object, but it does show the tendency of the
Court to intuitively lean in that direction, even while using the incorrect tests already
established. It is this author's assertion that the Court is trying grappling with the reality that
these Establishment Clause tests are simply inadequate while preserving the precedent that
has been created through their use.
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declined the invitation to repudiate it. Over the years, however,
no fewer than five of the currently sitting Justices have, in their
own opinions, personally driven pencils through the creature's
heart (the author of today's opinion repeatedly), and a sixth has
joined an opinion doing so.199
Although the Lemon Test-and in large part, the Endorsement Test-
does not explicitly take audience maturity into consideration, its curtailed
application and the incorporation of the various limiting factors listed
above indirectly subject this test to the evaluation of audience maturity,200
particularly in its evaluation of the primary effect of government action.
Unfortunately, this small and incremental attempt to salvage an otherwise
unworkable test leaves nothing but a sour taste in the mouths of those who
see it applied. Lemon's failure to include within its analysis anything that
would actually speak to the object of the Establishment Clause renders the
lemon unpalatable.
2. Is Coercion Synonymous With Violating the Right of Conscience?
Because the Coercion Test incorporates the perceptions and character of
the audience201 in an analysis of an alleged Establishment Clause violation,
the Coercion Test is appropriately viewed as the change in Lemon that
brought Establishment Clause jurisprudence closer to adequately reflecting
the object of the Establishment Clause. This test appropriately considers the
context of a governmental action to determine if "subtle coercive
pressure"202 amounted to an abridgment of an individual's freedom of
conscience. Accordingly, the incorporation of audience maturity as a
recognized factor under the Coercion Test would be unlikely to affect a
great change in the cases that have been evaluated under this test.
One result of an official acknowledgment of audience maturity as a
relevant consideration would be the increasing permissibility of
government-religion interaction as the audience of the action becomes
more mature. Many actions that might be appropriately considered
impermissible coercion in primary and secondary education institutions-
due to the immaturity of students, the parents' continued authority over
their children, and other inherent legal limitations based on age-would be
absolutely permissible, both in the general public arena and in the higher
199. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (citations omitted).
200. Pihos, supra note 11, at 1368-70.
201. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592-93 (1992).
202. Id. at 592.
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education fora.203 It is possible that the advent of public primary and
secondary education would in fact create a unique forum wherein an
increased level of Establishment Clause scrutiny might be required.20 4
3. The Marsh Approach Lands Close, But Does so Blindly
The Court in Marsh, through its application of historical practices and
understandings, concluded that official prayer before a state legislative
session was not a violation of the Establishment Clause.205 This test, like the
Coercion Test, comes very close to focusing on the object of the
Establishment Clause, but it misses the mark in the end. Instead of
evaluating whether such legislative prayer actually forces man's
conscience-a question the Marsh Court answered in the negative-the
Court attempts to justify the conclusion it believes is correct by pointing
only to the history and traditions of the country.206 Although such an
analysis is not without warrant, to stop at the point of discovering that such
practices were accepted by the very people who passed the First
Amendment completely fails to address why such practices were not
considered to be an establishment of religion in the first place, and thus
provides little-to-no aid in determining future Establishment Clause claims.
An understanding of audience maturity-those who were subjected to the
prayer are appropriately considered to be the best and brightest among us, a
people not readily prone to having their beliefs changed and their
consciences forced through the simple hearing of another's prayer-gives a
more appropriate understanding of why such an action is not a violation of
the First Amendment. When the factor of audience maturity is viewed in
203. Although the issue of Establishment Clause application in public schools is
obviously of great importance, this author argues that the issue inappropriately focuses on
whether the actions of public school officials violate the Establishment Clause. A more
appropriate evaluation and analysis would be on whether the very existence of public schools
necessarily violates-or at the very least raises serious concerns about-the Establishment
Clause. Unfortunately, however, a discussion of this subject would demand an entire article
of its own, and as such, is well outside the scope of what is intended to be covered here.
204. This "increased scrutiny" is only in reference to what would appropriately be the
level of scrutiny in a jurisprudence that approached the Establishment Clause from the
object-oriented analysis. It would not be increased beyond its current standard, a standard
which is at, or extremely close to, the limit of what the Establishment Clause should actually
prohibit. In other words, the unique environment that is created by primary and secondary
public education is the only justification for the increased scrutiny such Establishment
Clause claims have earned. In addition, the standard should necessarily be much lower for
government actions that affect an audience outside of the unique forum of public education.
205. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983).
206. Id.
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light of the object of the Establishment Clause, it becomes evident that such
a unique and particularized justification for the Court's holding in Marsh
was unwarranted.
V. CONCLUSION
The approach that should be taken when evaluating an Establishment
Clause claim is one that is rarely agreed upon, even by the Justices who sit
on our highest Court. Because this analysis deals with one of the most
intimate areas of human life-religion, individual spirituality, and civic
interaction-it will always be, in the words of Justice O'Connor, a "sensitive
matter."207 In an effort to create a method of evaluating this difficult and
sensitive area, the Court has delivered a perpetually changing line of
opinions that has given little in the way of stability or predictability to this
hugely important area of constitutional law. Part of the reason for this
confusion has resulted from losing sight of the actual purpose, or object, of
the Establishment Clause: to prohibit the National Government-and
through the Fourteenth Amendment, the States-from infringing on a
citizen's freedom and right of conscience. This right is not violated by
simple exposure to religious beliefs and practices that one does not agree
with; there is no general protection in the First Amendment against being
offended, engaged, or even persuaded by others in their desire to share their
religious convictions. The First Amendment, specifically the Establishment
Clause, only promises that the government will not engage in activity that
effectively forces an individual to do anything other than "worship[] God in
the manner, which, they believe, their accountability to him requires."208 To
punish someone for his beliefs, to force his conscience, or to otherwise
penalize him for worshiping God as he would chose, and to use the
government to achieve this end, is an absolute violation of the
Establishment Clause. For a government of the people to merely
acknowledge the religions and faiths of its people-yes, even to endorse
those religions-is not, however, synonymous with establishing religion.
This remains true even where the government would make resources
available or accommodate certain religious activities.
The issue of audience maturity may be relevant in a discussion of
whether a government activity or law violates the Establishment Clause, but
only insofar as it exposes the degree to which such a law or activity infringes
207. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 778 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
208. STORY, supra note 181, at §1870.
2012]1 595
LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
upon an individual's right of conscience. If government activity forces
children to either profess Allah as their god or disclaim their belief that he
is, then it has infringed upon that freedom of conscience, and must be
restrained. Nevertheless, the expressed will of the people to conduct prayers
of which none are forced to join, although potentially offensive to those of
us who believe differently, must not be struck down at the whims of the
select few-whether the offended high school student or the Justices
presiding on the bench.
Does this mean that each of us might have to sit at a graduation
ceremony and respectfully listen to a prayer or other religious expression
with which we do not agree or by which we are even offended? Yes. But it
will also ensure that we, as the American people, will always be free to
advance our faith and entreat others to discourse and dialogue on those
things we deem so important. The alternative is where we have been
heading and will likely continue to go absent a dramatic shift: the slow
sterilization of religion from the public arena will eventually turn into the
sterilization of our society from all things religious. For those of us who
profess faith in Jesus Christ, an increase of freedom in the public arena for
religious discussion and involvement-even of religions that we know are in
error-should not frighten us, but rather embolden and excite us. If we
believe that Christ is the truth, then affording people the freedom to make
their own choices and to voice their own beliefs actually gives us the
opportunity to see where their hearts and minds truly are, and only then
can we engage them with the Word, which never comes back void.209
209. Isaiah 55:11 (King James) ("So shall My word be that goeth forth out of my mouth:
it shall not return unto me void, but it shall accomplish that which I please, and it shall
prosper whereto I sent it.").
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